UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations
1-1-1996

Managers' stock ownership and performance in lodging industry
Yu J Qian
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds

Repository Citation
Qian, Yu J, "Managers' stock ownership and performance in lodging industry" (1996). UNLV Retrospective
Theses & Dissertations. 3252.
http://dx.doi.org/10.25669/a6to-y5fl

This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself.
This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. U M I
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter fiice, while others may be
from any type o f computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins,
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send U M I a complete
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted.

Also, if

unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced
form at the back o f the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact U M I directly to
order.

UMI
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zed) Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

MANAGERS’ STOCK OW NERSHIP
AND PERFORMANCE IN LO DG IN G INDUSTRY

by

Yu J. Qian

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science

in

Hotel Administration
W illiam F Harrah College of Hotel Administration
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
December, 1996

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number: 1383162

UMI Microform 1383162
Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI

300 North Zeeh Road
Ann Arbor, M l 48103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Thesis o f Yu Qian for the degree of Master of Science in Hotel Administration is
approved.

Chairperson, Zheng Gu, P hp.

Examming Corrunittee Member, John T. Bowen, Ph.D.

Examining Committee Member, Bernard Fried, Ph.D.

Graduate Faculty Representative, Percy Poon, Ph.D.

Dean of the Graduate college, Ronald W. Smith, Ph.D.

University of Nevada, Las Vegas
December, 1996

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT

Separation between owner and manager in the lodging
industry may cause a conflict of the interests between them.
An investigation was conducted to determine the relationship
between managerial ownership and performance in the lodging
industry and to further determine whether this relationship
differ across the two sectors, regular hotels and casino
hotels, in the lodging industry.
Statistical tests, using regression, revealed size
adjusted managers' ownership percentage had a significant
relationship with hotels performance in terms of operational
and managerial activities and shareholder's relevance, such
as profit margin, hotels operating return and hotels return
on equity.

Performance measured by these ratios is

positively, linearly related to managers' ownership.
Furthermore, the results of profit margin and operating
return did show significant difference between different
ownership levels.

The findings also indicated that

managers' ownership may be a more effective tool in
interests alignment for regular hotels than for casino
hotels.
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CHAPTER 1

IN T R O D U C T IO N

Background and Purpose of the Study
The relationship between stockholders and management is
an agency relationship.

Such a relationship exists whenever

someone (the principal) hires another (the agent) to
represent her/his interests.

Since there is no perfect

agency contract that can guarantee that managers act to
maximize the principle's interest, conflict of interests
between the principal and agent may arise.

The conflict

between managers and stockholders is called an agency
problem that prevails in corporations when management and
ownership are separated.

The principal can limit divergence

from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for
the agent(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).

It is, however,

generally impossible for the principal at zero cost to
ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the
principal's viewpoint.

This cost stemming from agency

relationship is termed as agency cost.
The traditional pattern of the hotel industry made up of
individually owned hotels has been changing in many

1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

countries to resemble more closely to manufacturing
industries.

With a number of companies going public as

modern corporations, sometimes managers are hired as agents
for hotel owners under management contracts, which provide
for the payment of expenses, management fees and/or sharing
of profits.

This might cause agency problem in the same way

as in other industries.
The goal of a lodging company is to maximize its
owners' or the shareholders' wealth (Andrew and Schmidgall,
1993).

To achieve this goal, the company must maximize its

revenue by providing customers with satisfactory services
and products while minimizing its cost.

When managers

operate hotels as agents, the objectives of management may
differ from those of stockholders. In a large corporation,
the stocks may be so widely held that stockholders cannot
even make known their objectives, much less control or
influence management.

This situation allows management to

act in its own best interests rather than those of the
stockholders. The conflict of interests between hotel
managers and shareholders is an important cause of the slide
in the lodging industry in the 1980s (Trice, 1992).
Stockholders hope that managers as their agents will
act in their best interests, and delegate decision-making
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authority to them.

Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the

first to develop a comprehensive theory of the firm under
the agency/owner framework.

They show that the principals

(stockholders) can assure themselves that the agent
(management) will make optimal decisions only if appropriate
incentives are given and only if the agent is monitored.
Incentives include stock options, bonuses, and perquisites,
and they are directly related to how close management
decisions come to the interests of stockholders.

Monitoring

can be done by bonding the agent, systematically reviewing
management perquisites, auditing financial statements, and
explicitly limiting management decisions.

These monitoring

activities necessarily involve costs, or agency costs as an
inevitable result of the separation of ownership and control
of a corporation.
To reduce agency costs, one way is to increase
managers' common stock ownership in the firm, so managers
can better align their interests with those of stockholders.
The less the ownership percentage of the managers, the less
the likelihood that they will behave in a manner consistent
with maximizing shareholder wealth, and the greater the need
for outside stockholders to monitor their activities.
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Throughout the 1980s, there was an increasing
separation between management and ownership in the lodging
industry (Trice,1992). Management made decisions that were
good for management, including the enhancement of a chain
label, pursuing managerial power by overbuilding hotels to
cause oversupply in the 1980s.

Those decisions were not

always in the best interests of ownership.

A large number

of hotels were developed and syndicated with the primary
objectives of producing development fees and management fees
with no on-going balance sheet liabilities.
investor was a secondary objective here.

Return to the

Somewhere along

the way, managers almost forgot the interests of ownership.
This separation of decision-making and risk-bearing function
also caused agency conflicts, and, therefore, may have
raised the agency costs.
Therefore it is important to investigate the role of
managers' stock ownership in limiting agency conflicts and
maximizing the stockholders' wealth in the lodging industry.
It is also necessary to determine the relationship between
managers' stock ownership and lodging corporations'
financial performance.
Thus far, research on the relationship between
managers' stock ownership and firm performance has yielded
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inconclusive results.

Some studies (Kim, Lee, and Francis,

1988; Hudson, Jahera and Lloyd, 1992) showed that there was
a significantly positive relationship between

managers'

common stock ownership and firm performance, while some
studies failed to discover a relationship between them
(Demesetz, 1983; Lloyd, Jahera, and Goldstein, 1986;
Tsetsekos and Defusco, 1990).

Other studies concluded that

stock ownership did not have the same effect on firm
performance in low-growth industries and high-growth
industries( Kesner, 1987). Still other researchers (Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988) found a significant nonmonotonic
relationship between managers' stock ownership and firm
performance.
There are a number of problems inherent in previous
ownership/performance relationship studies which may explain
the inconclusive results.

First, some studies (Lloyd,

Jahera and Golddtein, 1986) used multi-industry samples
instead of investigating a single industry.

Since industry-

specific effects were not controlled for, their results
could be distorted.

Second, some studies have used a single

measure of performance, either accounting or market measure
(Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988) instead of using both
measures.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The purpose of this study is to examine the
relationship between managers' common stock ownership and
financial performance of firms, using only the lodging
industry data.

To date, no study on the managers' common

stock ownership and performance relationship has been
conducted for the lodging

industry. This study will

investigate such relationship in the lodging industry.

The

results of this study will reveal whether and how managers'
stock ownership may lead to improved hotels financial
performance.
This study will be different from previous studies in
the following ways.

First, the focus of this study will be

on a single industry, i.e. the lodging industry, in order to
avoid inter-industries effects. Second, this study will use
a set of accounting measures of performance, such as return
on assets, return on equity, return on investment, operating
return and profit margin, and a market measure, stock
return, and compare the results of different measures.
Third, this study will use size-adjusted managers' ownership
percentage instead of directly using ownership percentage.
Size effect through ownership was found in previous
empirical studies.

The managers in companies with different

sizes (measured by market value of shareholders' equity)
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were found to have different levels of

incentive even

though the manager ownership percentage were the same.
This study will separate regular hotels and casino
hotels to examine if the ownership and performance
relationship is different in the sectors.

Casino hotels are

a special sector in the lodging industry.

They have many

features different from regular hotels.

Casino hotels'

profits come mainly from gaming operation, rather than room
operation.

Besides, they belong to the fast-growth sector

while regular hotels are in the slow-growth sector of the
lodging industry.
Recently the lodging industry is experiencing a strong
recovery after a long downward slide since the 1980s. To
prevent the 1980s' problem from reoccurring, separation
between management and ownership of hotels as one of the
important causes of the slide in the 1980s still needs to be
investigated (Trice, 1992).

How to better align the

interests of decision-making managers with those of riskbearing shareholders in the further needs to be explored in
the lodging industry.

Since no previous study on managers'

common stock ownership and performance has been documented
in the hospitality industry, this study attempts to extend
previous research on managers' stock ownership and
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performance relationship into the lodging

industry.

By

choosing the lodging industry to investigate the managers'
ownership/performance relationship, this study hopefully
will enable researchers, stockholders and managers in the
hospitality industry to determine if increasing managers'
stock ownership can better align the interests between
managers and stockholders, and therefore may provide some
clues for enhancing the hotel performance in the days to
come.

Research Questions
The purpose of this study is to investigate if the
managers' ownership can improve hotel performance.

Research

questions related to the purpose include:
1. Is there a significant relationship between
managers' ownership and hotel performance?

If there

is a significant relationship, how performance is
related to managers' ownership?
2. If managers' ownership does have an impact on
performance, does the impact differ across the slowgrowing hotel sector and the fast-growing casino
sector?

Is managers' ownership more effective in
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owner/manager interests alignment in one sector than
in the other sector?
Finding the answers to these questions could assist in
reducing the interest conflict between managers and
shareholders, and hence lead to lower agency cost and better
performance.

Potential Contributions of Study
The potential contribution of this study to the
hospitality industry and agency theory research are:
1. Finance theory states that managers' ownership
affects firm's performance.

Many lodging companies

have practice in managers' common stock ownership.
Research on the hotel managerial stock ownership,
however, has not been documented.

This research

will be an exploratory study that extends previous
research on other industries into the lodging
industry.
2. Most of the previous empirical studies of managers'
common stock ownership used a single measure, either
accounting or market measure.

This study will use

both and compare the results.
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3 . Previous empirical studies on the managerial
ownership /performance relationship used data mainly
from manufacturing industries.

By using the data

from the lodging industry, a major service industry
in the United States, this study could provide
important additional empirical evidence for the
agency theory.
4. Previous studies used the managers stock percentage
as a measure of ownership, without any adjustment.
This study uses managerial stock percentage adjusted
by firm size as the measure of ownership.
Therefore, the size impact will be controlled.

5. Previous studies have found that, for both slowgrowing industries and fast-growing industries,
stock ownership do not appear to influence
performance in the same way.

Since within the

lodging industry, regular hotels are a slow-growing
sector whereas casino hotels are a fast-growing
sector.

This study will investigate the impact of

growth within a service industry.
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Delimitation of Study
This study will investigate publicly traded lodging
corporations. Those corporations are further divided into
two sectors: regular hotels and casino hotels. Those
companies with a small scale hotel operation but a large
scale of other industrial operations are not covered in the
study.

Casino equipment, software development companies are

not included in the study.

Riverboat casino companies are

not a part of the study, since they don't provide
accommodations.

In this study, managers' ownership refers

to shares held by officers and directors at the corporate
level.

Ownership by lower levels of managers is not treated

as managerial ownership.

Organization of the Study
This study is composed of five chapters.

Chapter 1

provides a background of the study, including the problem
statement and objectives.

Specific research questions are

presented and terms defined.

Chapter 2 reviews the agency

theory and empirical studies on the relationship between
managers' common stock ownership and performance.
is a discussion of the research methodology.

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

analyzes the data and the statistical results of hypotheses
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testing.

Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the studies and

provides recommendations for further research.

Definition of the Terms
The following is a list of the definitions of some
specific terms used in this research study:
Financial Performance;

It refers to a firm's accounting

profitability such as Return on Assets (ROA), and
Return on Equity (ROE), as well as a firm's market
performance or stock return.
Return On Assets: Return on assets measures the firm's
ability to utilize its assets to create profits.
the return on total investment.

It is

It is calculated as

the net income after taxes divided by total assets.
Return on Equity: This is another profitability ratio that
relates profits to investments. It is expressed as net
income after taxes minus preferred stock dividend then
divided by common shareholders' equity.

It is the

return to owners' equity.
Profit Margin; Profit margin is a

profitability ratio

focusing on activity, which is calculated as net income
divided by total sales.
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Return on Investment; Return on investment measures the
relationship between the income earned and the capital
invested.

It is calculated as net income divided by-

average long-term liabilities plus equity.
Operating Return: It is the ratio of operating cash flow to
total operating assets.

Operating assets is defined as

total assets minus invest & advance to subsidies.
Stock Return; is the percentage of price change in certain
period.

It is calculated as : R = (P^-Pg) /Pg.

If a

company pays dividend, the return is R = (P^+ Dir.- Pg)/
Pg.

In this study, it is the first nine months of 1996

stock price change adjusted by dividends and stock
split effect.
Casino Hotels;

The hotels that house a gambling casino,

which includes games of chance using cards, dice, and
slot machines.
Regular Hotels; The hotels that provide accommodation and
may operate other functions such as entertainment and
food and beverage as business.
Firm Size Index: The log to the base 10 of the market value
of the firms(Lnsize) is selected for calculating the
index.

The smallest Lnsize is used as the benchmark.
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The size index is created by dividing each company's
Lnsize by the benchmark.
Size Adjusted Mangers' Ownership Percentage; size adjusted
MOP is obtained by multiplying the original MOP by the
size index.
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CHAPTER 2
R E VIE W OF THE RELATED L IT E R A T U R E

Introduction
The previous chapter briefly discussed the background
of the ownership and performance relationship.
questions were formulated and terms defined.

Research
This chapter

provides a detailed review of the literature.
Since the ownership and performance relationship is
derived from agency theory.

This study will first review

the literature about the agency theory. The literature in
this area has grown quite large.
contains three parts.

This section of review

(1)three important researchers,

(2)agency theory and agency cost, and(3)solutions to agency
problem.
The second section of the review specifically focuses
on three parts.

The first part focuses on empirical studies

about managerial ownership/performance relationship.
Variety of methods and different results will be reviewed.
The reasons for diverse findings will be investigated.
the second part, employee stock ownership plans will be

15
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reviewed as an well-known strategy of using ownership as an
incentive to enhance corporation performance.

The third

part will review the importance of managerial ownership as
an incentive in the hospitality industry.
The last section of the chapter is a summary of the
review of the theory and empirical studies.

Theoretical Background

Agency Theory.

Three important researchers :
Adam Smith(1776)
Agency theory dates back to 1776, when Adam Smith
recognized the inevitable conflicts that arise between the
interests of owners and managers of a company in his classic
economics book

"The Wealth of Nations".

The directors of such [joint-stock] companies,
however, being the managers rather of other people's
money than of their own, it cannot well be expected,
that they should watch over it with the same anxious
vigilance with which the partners in a private
copartnery frequently watch over their own.

Like the

stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider
attention to small matters as not for their master's
honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation
from having it.

Negligence and profusion, therefore.
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must always prevail, more or less, in the management of
the affairs of such a company.

As the first person to discover the conflicts between
the interests of owners and managers of a company, Adam
Smith inspirited a lot of economists who later conducted
extensive further researches in this area.

Berle and Means(1932)
The agency problem, caused by the separation of
ownership and control in the modern corporation, is an issue
brought to the force so effectively by Berle and
Means(1932).

It remains a central position in recent

writings about the economic theory of the firm.

The problem

is stated succinctly by Berle and means (1932) :
The separation of ownership from control produces
a condition where the interests of owner and of
ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and where
many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the
use of power disappear....
In creating these new relationships, the quasipublic corporation may fairly be said to work a
revolution.

It... has divided ownership into nominal

ownership and the power formerly joined to it.

Thereby

the corporation has changed the nature of profitseeking enterprise.
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The holder of corporate stock experiences a loss of
control over his resources because ownership is so broadly
dispersed across large numbers of shareholders that the
typical shareholder cannot exercise real power to oversee
managerial performance in modern corporations,

Management

exercises more freedom in the use of the firm's resources
than would exist if the firm were managed by its owner(s),
or at least, if ownership interests were more concentrated.
Because management and ownership interests do not naturally
coincide when not housed in the same person, Berle and
Means(1932) perceive a conflict of interest, which, with
ownership dispersed, is resolved in management's favor.
When managers hold little equity in the firm and
shareholders are too dispersed to enforce value
maximization, corporate assets may be deployed to benefit
managers rather than shareholders.

Such managerial benefits

can include shirking and perquisite-taking, but also
encompass pursuit of such non-value-maximizing objectives as
sales growth, empire building, and employee welfare.
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Jensen and Meckling(1976)
This stream of research has implications for economic
theory and policy because it examines a fundamental premise
of classic economic theory, that the management of a firm
does and should reflect the interests of its owners.

If we

assume a difference between the interests of owners and
management, it follows logically that with great separation
of control, the making of polices and decisions will not
adequately reflect the interests of the owners.

An

important early study by Berle (195 9) concluded that
shareholders controlled only 34 percent of the 2 00 largest
nonfinancial corporations in the U.S..

Larner (1970)

reported that this figure had dropped to 12 percent.

Such a

finding strikes at a core idea of classic economics because
owners, interested in profitability, may lose control of
their assets to management who may have different
intentions.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) are the researchers who
systematically developed a theory of the ownership structure
of the firm from the theory of agency, the theory of
property rights and the theory of finance.

They define the

concept of agency cost, show its relationship to the
"separation and control" issue, investigate the nature of
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the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and
outside equity, demonstrate who bears these costs and why,
and provide a new definition of the firm.
They defined an agency relationship as a contract under
which one or more persons, or the principal (s) , engage
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their
behalf which involves delegating some decision making
authority to the agent.
They defined agency costs as the sum of
monitoring expenditures by the principal,
expenditures by the agent,

(1) the

(2) the bonding

(3) the residual cost-- the

dollar equivalent of the reduction in wealth experienced by
the principal due to this divergence.

Agency.theory and Agency cost
In its simplest form, agency theory attempts to explain
the divergence of interests of various stakeholders in a
company.

These stakeholders include not only owners and

managers but also creditors, employees, and suppliers.

A

corporation can be viewed as the nexus for a set of
contracting relationships among these constituents.

Agency

theory supports understanding into the divergence of
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interests among the stakeholders of a firm and the problems
and costs that emerge from this divergence.
Agency theory is important whenever there is separation
of ownership and control. The principals of a organization
are the owners or stockholder, and the agents are the
managers who control most aspects of the organization.

In

small proprietorships, the goals and desires of management
are one in the same with the owners since both roles are
filled by one person.

But as a company increases in size

and complexity, the owners may become separated form the day
to day decisions of the company.

Management may act in its

own best interest and not the interests of the owners.

The

principal can limit divergence from his interests by
establishing appropriate incentives for agents and by
incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the unwanted
behavior of an agent.
Managers have a propensity to pursue their own
interests when that conflict with those of the stockholders.
This conflict gives rise to equity agency costs.

For

example, managers may seek to consume excessive perquisites
at shareholders' expense, they may make short-run operating
decisions that benefit themselves but hurt stockholders, and
they may make operating decisions that reduce their personal
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risk despite stockholders' preferences for more corporate
risk taking.

SolutiQng-J;.c>. Agengy .problems

There are several ways to reduce equity agency costs.
One way in which equity agency costs may be reduced is for
managers to increase their common stock ownership in the
firm, better aligning their interests with stockholders'
interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).

In the extreme case

of 100% ownership, managers can reduce equity agency costs
to zero.

However, as managers increase their ownership in

the firm, their personal wealth becomes less diversified.
For example, to achieve 100% ownership of a large
corporation, managers' diversification costs would become
exorbitant, since they would have to resort to large
personal borrowings to finance the larger outlays.

Thus,

using increased managerial stock ownership to control agency
costs is not costless.

As managers' wealth becomes more

poorly diversified, they will require increasing amounts of
compensation.
A second way to reduce equity agency costs is to
increase dividends (Rozeff, 1982 and Easterbrook, 1984) .
Paying larger dividends increases the chance that external
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equity capital will have to be raised.

When new equity is

raised, managers are monitored by the Exchanges, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, investment bankers, and
providers of new capital.

This monitoring induces managers

who seek to retain their employment to act more in line with
stockholders' interests.

However, the use of dividends is

not costless. When external capital is raised to pay for
the dividends, substantial flotation costs will be paid to
investment bankers.
A third way to reduce equity agency costs is to use
more debt financing (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Using more
debt reduces total equity financing, reducing in turn the
scope of the manager-stockholder conflict.

However, debt

financing introduces conflicts of interest between
stockholders and creditors that gives rise to debt agency
costs.

One concern of bondholders is that stockholders may

seek to expropriate their wealth by increasing their risk
through risky corporate investment decisions, or perhaps
through inducing unanticipated priority dilution.

Myers

(1977) points out another conflict will arise if the firm
has discretionary investments.

When managers have

discretion over some investments, they may forgo those
investments for which the main benefit is to increase
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bondholders' wealth rather than stockholders' wealth.

Other

more obvious debt agency costs include bankruptcy costs and
the costs incurred as bondholders seek contractual
protection (Smith and Warner, 1979).
A fourth way to reduce equity agency costs is to use
institutional investors as monitoring agents (Bathala, Moon,
and Rao, 1994).

Historically, institutional investors

dissatisfied with managerial or stock performance simply
sold their holdings.

i.e., followed an "exit" policy.

However, this has become increasingly difficult for many
institutions because they must accept substantial discounts
in order to liquidate their significant holdings.
(1991)

Coffee

provides an insight into the changing behavior of

institutional investors from being passive investors to
active monitors.

The institutional investors put pressure

on corporations, sought special "institutional investor
seat" on the board to protect their interests, or set up
shareholder committees to monitor their financial
performance.
Equity and debt agency costs reduce firm value.

To

reduce these costs, managers can choose the least costly
financial policy mix, trading off the benefits and costs of
personal stock ownership with the benefits and costs of
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paying dividends.

In this way, management adopts a policy

mix that is uniquely related to their firm's respective
policy benefits and costs.

Managers' incentive to seek the

least-cost policy mix comes from potential increases in
their personal wealth and from external competitive market
forces.

Insider ownership, debt and dividend policies

might be related directly through agency theories. Three
stakeholder groups are most relevant:

firm managers,

external shareholders, and creditors.

Jenson and Meckling

(1976) provide an analysis of the effects of agency
conflicts among the three groups.

Their analysis suggests

that the proportion of equity controlled by insiders should
influence the firm's policies.
(1992)

Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn

did research to examine the determinants of cross-

sectional differences in insider ownership, debt, and
dividend policies.

They found the level of insider

ownership has a negative influence on a firm's debt and
dividend levels. Firms with a high level of insider
ownership have a low level of debt and dividend.
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Literature on Ownership and Performance Relationship

Managers' Ownership and Performance. Relationship
Because the role of managers' common stock ownership is
central to the Jensen and Meckling agency theory (1976), an
increasing body of literature has indicated that managerial
stock ownership helps in aligning managerial interests with
those of the external stockholders.
Research focusing on the influence of ownership
structure is plentiful.

The following is a review of some

major studies in this field.
Kim, Lee, and Francis (1988) discovered there was a
relation between insider ownership and returns. More
specifically, they examined a sample of 157 firms over a
four-year period (1975-78) using size, ownership, and E/P
determined portfolios.

Their conclusions supported the

hypothesis that there was an agency effect on performance.
That is , returns were related to insider ownership.
Hudson, Jahera and Lloyd (1992) using piecewise
regression model also obtained the result that there was a
significantly positive relationship between the degree of
insider ownership and performance.
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An interesting finding from the management literature
is the conclusion of Salancik and Pfeffer(1980) that " the
capital markets impose a discipline on management controlled
firms in that tenure is related to the firm's share price
performance."
An interesting finding from the management literature
is the conclusion of Salancik and Pfeffer(1980) that " the
capital markets impose a discipline on management controlled
firms in that tenure is related to the firm's share price
performance."
In contrast, Demsetz (1983) found that the ownership
structure of the firm that "emerges as an endogenous outcome
of competitive selection in which various cost advantages
and disadvantages are balanced to arrive at an equilibrium
organization of the firm". Accordingly, Demsetz concluded
that there was no relation between ownership structure and
accounting profitability.
The study by Tsetsekos and DeFusco (1990) also
concluded that managerial ownership did not have an effect
on market returns and that the size effect was independent
of ownership.
An earlier work by Lloyd, Jahera, and Goldstein (1986)
also found no significant relationship between managerial
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ownership and performance. Their performance measure was
mean monthly portfolio return.

In their study the ownership

structure was measured by the percent of stock held by the
largest holder.

A total sample of 779 firms from the New

York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX),
and over the counter (OTC) was included.

No significant

ownership effect was found when controlling for the size of
the firm.
Another study by Kesner (1987) focused on the stock
ownership of members of the board of directors for 250 of
the Fortune 500 companies.

That study showed the managerial

ownership/performance relationship differed among different
industries.

They found that in rapid growth industries,

managers might see a greater opportunity for increasing the
value of their investment at a rapid pace through aligning
their interests with other shareholders interests.
turn, might enhance organizational performance.

This, in

Conversely,

in low growth or more stable industries, managers might feel
there was less opportunity for rapid increase of their
returns due to the nature of the industry, and as a result,
managerial ownership might give less incentive.

Their

empirical results indicated that, for low-growth industries,
stock ownership did not appear to influence either current
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or future performance.

Alternatively, high-growth

industries did reveal a positive and significant
relationship between stock ownership of the board and
performance.
Morck, shleifer, and Vishny(1988) examined the
relationship between management ownership and the market
valuation for a sample of large firms. They found there was
a significant nonmonotonic relationship between management
ownership and market valuation of the firm, as measured by
Tobin's Q.

They concluded that Demsetz and Lehn's (1985)

failure to find a relationship between ownership
concentration and profitability was probably due to their
use of a linear specification that did not capture an
important nonmonotonicity.

In

Morck, Shleifer and Vishny's

research (1988) , they estimated a variety of piecewise
linear regressions.

The results suggested a positive

relation between ownership and Q in the 0% to 5% board
ownership range, a negative and less pronounced relation in
the 5% to 25% range, and a further positive relation beyond
25%.

These results were consistent with both the

convergence-of-interests and entrenchment effects.

The

initial rise in Q as ownership rose might reflect managers'
greater incentives to maximize value as their stakes rose.
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Beyond the 5% ownership level, however, increases in
managerial ownership may be associated with conditions
conducive to the entrenchment of incumbent management such
as status as a founder, increased voting power, increased
tenure with and attachment to the firm, lower employment of
professional managers, and dominance of inside over outside
directors on the board.

Some form of entrenchment might

explain the declining valuation of corporate assets as board
ownership rose from 5% to 25%.

Throughout this range, the

incentive effect could still be operative; it was just
dominated by the entrenchment effect.

As board ownership

reached the neighborhood of 25%, managers with even higher
board ownership might not be significantly more entrenched
than those with 25% ownership.

With 25-30% ownership, the

board might be effectively free to reject any outside
challenge.

The increase in Q for the very highest ownership

levels then might reflect a pure convergence-of-interest
effect.
McConnell and Servaes (1990) also investigated the
relation between Tobin's Q and the structure of equity
ownership for a sample of 1,173 firms for 1976 and 1093
firms for 1986. They found a significant curvilinear
relation between Q and the fraction of common stock owned by
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corporate insiders.

The curve slopes upward until insider

ownership reached approximately 40% to 50% and then slopes
slightly down ward.

The results were consistent with the

hypothesis that corporate value was a function of the
structure of equity ownership.

Managers' ownership percentage and firm size
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found that ownership
concentration and firm size, measured by the market value of
equity, are inversely related.

Large firms exhibit a

distinct separation between ownership and control.
levels of managerial ownership often exist.

Low

The large

market value of those firms and the wide dispersion of
shareholdings mean that managers cannot hold a sizable
percentage of shares. The more concentrated ownership
structure of small firms may involve substantial managerial
ownership percentage.
Tsetsekos and Defusco (1990) realized it was not
accurate to use managers' ownership percentage as a proxy
without controlling size effect.

They explored the

interrelationship among portfolio returns, managerial
ownership, and size.

To isolate the effect of managerial

ownership on portfolio returns, the impact of size was
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controlled for.

They held size constantly, and treated

managerial ownership as a proxy for the convergence of
interest between managers and shareholders, and found the
positive significant managerial ownership/performance
relationship.

Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) and Corporate
Escformance
ESOP is a employee benefit plan. Unlike other benefit
plans, the employees have a chance to make a difference for
the firm.

Although many employees own stocks in a wide

variety of other companies through their pension funds,
there is nothing they can do to improve the financial health
of those companies and thereby increase the value of the
stocks in their accounts.

With an ESOP, employees can work

to improve the profitability of the company they work for
and thereby increase the value of the stock in their
individual accounts.

Right now there are more than ten

thousand employee stock ownership plans and over 11 million
ESOP employee-owners.

America has a healthy and growing

employee-owner sector.
The primary purpose of ESOPs is and always has been to
widen the ownership base of substantial capital estates.
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other goals are mentioned in any of the legislation
governing ESOPs.

Nonetheless, many advocates of employee

ownership predicted that one of its benefits would be to
improve corporate performance by linking the financial
interests of employees and companies (Mcallister and Marsh,
1980) .
The first effort to address the issue more
systematically was a comprehensive survey undertaken by the
NCEO of twenty-seven hundred employees in thirty-seven ESOP
firms (Rosen, Klein, and Young, 1991).

The purpose was to

discover whether ownership really did have an impact on
employees' attitudes.

The answer was clearly yes.

The more

stoke employees owned in their company, the more committed
they were to the firm, the more satisfied they were with
their work, the less likely they were to look for other
jobs, and the more they liked being owners.

The positive

effects of ownership were magnified when active programs
were adopted for sharing information and soliciting
employees' input into decisions at all levels of the
company.
According to Rosen, Klein, and Young (1991), overall,
the ESOP firms grew 3 to 4 percent per year faster than they
would have without the ESOP, depending on the measure used.
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Over a ten-year period, this growth would create almost 50
percent more jobs in the ESOP companies.

A closer look at

the data showed that most of the growth occurred in the most
participative one-third of the companies, those that allowed
for relatively high degrees of employee input into job-level
decision making.
year better.

These firms performed 11 to 17 percent per

Participation was measured by asking managers

to tell how much influence nonmanagement employees had over
issues ranging from social events to corporate policy.
Firms were considered to be participative if employees at
least had the opportunity to share decision making with
management on issues affecting the organization and
performance of their jobs.
One might interpret this finding to mean that it is
participation, not ownership, that makes the difference, but
that did not turn out to be the case. According to Rosen,
Klein, and Young (1991), many other studies have found that
participation alone has only an ambiguous and generally very
short-lived impact on performance.

Ownership motivates

employees; participation gives them an opportunity to use
this motivation to contribute their ideas, knowledge, and
experience to help the company grow.
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This relationship between ownership, participation, and
performance has become the conventional wisdom, backed by a
growing number of examples from companies that have used
this approach.

Both the critics of ESOPs and most of its

advocates agree that participative management is essential
to assuring that employee ownership will improve corporate
performance (Rosen and Young, 1991).

The relationship

between manager ownership and performance of the firms also
need to be investigated, since managers are a special
section of employee.

The _Importance of Managerial Ownership as an Incentive

in

the.üQg.pitality Industry

A survey of general managers of more than 80 four- and
five star hotels in the United States(Dingman, 1995) found
that their mean annual base salary was $111,000, although
bonuses typically added another 25 percent to that amount.
Survey respondents thought that the prospect of larger
bonuses would motivate them to greater performance.
From the result of the survey, the proportion of GMs
holding equity in their property was found rising from
hardly any in 1992 survey to 13 in the 1995 survey.

One-

fifth of those managing a hotel with room rates between $101
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and $200 held stock, and one in ten GMs in hotels with rates
above $200 did so, but none of the GMs managing hotels in
the low-price category(under $100 room rate)held stock or
stock options. Marriott is in third place of the lists of
companies for which these GMs would prefer to work.

It is

because they offer managers stock options and profit
sharing.

The survey results show that there may be an

intention to use ownership and stock option to motivate
hotel managers for better performance in the high end of the
hotel industry.
As the lodging industry continues to stabilize and
recover from the downturn, relationships between managers
and owners continue to be in flux with new patterns of
ownership, finance and management emerging(Sheridan, 1995).
Years ago, management got long-term, non-cancelable, fullfree contracts.

With the downturn, owners saw managers

getting fees for running hotels, and expanding hotels supply
blindly only for serving their own interests, with no money
flowing to owners.

They finally woke up and sought changes.

According to Sheridan (1995), owners were looking for two
things- profitability and asset appreciation.

They wanted

to make money, and they wanted their asset to increase in
value.

This was the new owners/managers relationship.
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Owners tried to reduce the agency cost and improve hotels
performance.

The classic 5% of gross management fee

disappeared.

Fees are now basically a smaller percentage of

the gross and larger percentage of profit or improved
profit.

Today, management fees, depending on the size, can

be 2% to 4% of the gross revenue, but they may m n as much
as 10% to 12% of net operating profit before debt service.
Beyond those, some owners require management company have
the ownership percentage to insure their acting for
maximizing stockholders wealth.
In the new owner/manager relationship,

hotels owners

have been more active to monitor their agent-managers.

This

new agency relationship can align managers' interests to the
owner's objective.

For example, the days of ego-driven

managers who load their properties with services and
facilities, such as : expensive exotic flowers, that make
guests happy but owners poorer are numbered(Sheridan, 1995).
Managers' ownership along with performance-based
compensation have been used by owners to force hotels
managers to reduce cost and align their interests with those
of owners.
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Summary
This chapter has given a wide literature support for my
research questions.

The first section of the literature

review indicates the importance of aligning the interests of
managers with those of owners, thus providing the basis of
this study.
The second section of the literature review provides
the support for my test hypotheses.

The results from

previous studies on managerial ownership/performance
relationship have been mixed, inconclusive and inconsistent.
Most of the previous studies have used data from
manufacturing industries, rather than from service
industries.

Market and accounting measures have been

alternately used, rather than being used together
consistently.

Further research to provide evidence form

service industries with both market and accounting
performance measures is therefore needed.

In the last part

of this section, hotel managers compensation and incentive
surveys were reviewed.

Those surveys' results imply that

managerial ownership could be a tool for better aligning
hotel managers' interests with those of owners and reduce
agency conflicts in the lodging industry.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

Introduction
The objective of this study is to investigate the
relationship between managers' ownership and performance in
lodging industry. Findings of the study may enable the
lodging industry to determine if increasing managers'
ownership is an effective way to align interests of managers
with that of stockholders.

This chapter discusses the

methodology used to investigate managerial ownership/
performance relationship.

It is divided into four major

sections :
1. Research hypotheses
2 . Statistical testing methods
3 . Data
4 . Variables

39
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Research Hypotheses
Specific

null

hypotheses

designed

to

answer

the

research questions raised in chapter 1 are presented below:

Hypothesis 1:
There

is

no

relationship

between

managers'

ownership and financial performance of hotels.

This null hypothesis is related to the first research
question and a

part of the second

research question.

To

test the relationship between ownership and performance,
size-adjusted managers' stock holding percentage will be
used as a measure of managers' ownership.

Measures of

performance include five accounting ratios: return on assets
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), profit margin (PM),
operating return(OR), return on investment (ROD, and a
market ratio: return on stock(SR). The relationship between
ownership and performance will be first tested for the
lodging industry as a whole.

Separate tests on the fast-

growing casino hotel sector and slow-growing regular hotel
sector will follow up.

The following is a list of the sub-
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hypotheses testing each performance variable for hypothesis
1.

Sub-Hypotheses for H^:
There

is no relationship

between managers'

ownership and profit margin of hotels
There

is no relationship

between managers'

ownership and return on assets of hotels.
Hi<c>: There

is no relationship

between managers'

ownership and return on equity of hotels.
H , :There

is no relationship

ownership

and

return

between managers'
on

investment

of

hotels.
: There

is no relationship

between managers'

ownership and operating return of hotels.
: There

is no relationship

between managers'

ownership and stock return of hotels.

Hypothesis 2 :
There is no difference on financial performance
between hotels which have different levels of
managers' ownership.
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This null hypothesis is designed to further answer the
first

research question.

To test this hypothesis, hotels

with same level of relative ownership percentages will be
grouped together. Then the financial performance between
each group will be compared to determine if any significant
differences in performance exist.
The sub-hypotheses for each performance variable of
hypothesis 2 are:
H2 <a>= There is no difference on profit margin
between hotels which have different
managers' ownership levels.
H2 cb.= There is no difference on return on assets
between hotels which have different
managers' ownership levels.
Hz.c, : There is no difference on return on equity
between hotels which have different
managers' ownership levels.
: There is no difference on return on
investment between hotels which have
different managers' ownership levels.
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: There is no difference on operating return
between hotels which have different
managers' ownership levels.
H;,., : There is no difference on stock return
between hotels which have different
managers' ownership levels.

Hypothesis 3 :
There is no significant difference on 5-year sales
growth between regular hotels and casino hotels.

This null hypothesis is designed to answer the second
research question.

It is well known that the casino hotel

sector has grown fast recently.

The difference in growth

between the regular and casino hotel sectors, however, needs
to be tested before the regular hotel sector can be defined
as the slow-growing sector, and the casino sector, the fastgrowing sector of the lodging industry.
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Statistical Testing Methods
To test the hypotheses and answer the research
questions proposed in Chapter 1, The SPSS statistical
software package was used to conduct regression and perform
Mann-Whitney and Kruskal Wallis tests.
The regression was used to test the first hypothesis.
The result of this test would indicate if positive or
negative relationship exists between the managers' ownership
and the financial performance, and how strong this
relationship is. The regression was also run separately
for regular hotels and casino hotels to see if the
managerial ownership/performance relationship would differ
across the two different sectors, slow-growing hotels and
fast-growing casinos.
Kruskal-Wallis test was used to test the second
hypothesis. The result of this test would indicate whether
or not the mean ranks of financial performance in different
adjusted MOP groups are significantly different from one
another.

As some variables failed to show normal

distribution, the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test, which
requires no normal distribution, was utilized to test this
hypothesis.
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The Mann-Whitney test was used to test the third
hypothesis, the difference in growth between the two
sectors.

The Mann-Whitney test, a non-parametric substitute

for the parametric t-test, is often used to test the
difference between two groups. The Mann-Whitney test was
used to test the third hypothesis because the data of the
5-year sales growth of two sectors were not normally
distributed.

The result of the test will indicate if

casino hotels can be treated as fast-growth sectors while
the regular hotels can be treated as slow-growth sectors.

Data
This study concentrates on the lodging industry. All
data were drawn from the lodging industry that includes
regular and casino hotels.
The research is limited to publicly traded hotel, motel
and casino firms which provide accommodation.

The

hotel/motel and casino hotel data were obtained from Compact
Disclosure database.

Some thinly traded small firms, which

were not listed in the database, are not included in this
study.

The casino hotels are the firms with a primary SIC

code of 7011(hotel and motel) and a secondary SIC code of
7993 (coin-amusement), or the firms with a primary SIC code
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of 7993 and a secondary SIC code of 7011.

The regular

hotels are the firms with only one primary SIC code of 7011.
Stock return data were obtained from the Wall Street
Journal.

Those hotels and casinos that aretraded

in non

national systems are not included in this study due to the
difficulty to get their data.

Stock Return is defined as

the percentage price change between Jan. 2, 1996 to Sep. 6,
1996.

The formula is :
R = (P, - Po)/P,
R = Stock Return
P, = Closing Price on Sep. 6, 1996
Pq = Closing Price on Jan. 2, 1996

If a company pays dividend, then the formula is
R = (Pi + D - Pa)/Po
D = dividend amount during the holding period
The final sample for this study includes 20 regular
hotels and 25 casino hotels which have all the necessary
data available.

Tables 1 and 2 list the regular hotel firms

and casino hotel firms used in this study.
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Table 1
Liât <?■£. Regular Hotels

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Buckhead America Corp.
Sonesta International Hotels Corp.
Jameson Inns Inc.
Amerihost Properties Inc.
John Q Hammons Hotels Inc.
Kahler Realty Corp.
Studio Plus Hotels Inc.
Supertel Hospitality Inc.
Suburban Lodges Of America Inc.
Wyndham Hotel Corp.
Marriott International Inc.
Service Inc.
Bristol Hotel Corp.
Extended Stay America Inc.
Doubletree Corp.
Starwood Lodging Corp.
Sholodge Inc.
La Quinta Inns Inc.
Host Marriott Corp.
Renaissance Hotel Group N V

Table 2
Lig.t
1

2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9
10
11
12

-Casino .Hotels

Casino Resource Corp.
Black Hawk Gaming & Development
Monarch Casino & Resort Inc.
Pratt Hotel Corp.
Boomtown Inc.
President Casinos Inc.
Lady Luck Gaming Corp.
Gaylord Entertainment Corp.
Hollywood Casino Corp.
Casino Magic Corp.
Harveys Casino Resorts
Ameristar Casinos Inc.
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13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts
Rio Hotel & Casino Inc.
Aztar Corp.
Showboat Inc.
Station Casinos Inc.
Primadonna Resorts Inc.
Boyd Gaming Corp.
Bally Entertainment Corp.
MGM Grand Inc.
Mirage Resorts Inc.
Griffin Gaming & Entertainment
Circus Circus Enterprises Inc.
Hilton Hotels Corp.

Variables
The dependent variables in this study are the hotel
performance ratios.

For the purposes of this study, five

profitability ratios, return on assets (ROA), operating
return(OR), return on equity(ROE), total return to
investors (ROD , and profit margin (PM) were used as
accounting performance measures.

Stock return (SR) was used

as a market measure of performance.

Different profitability

ratios, reflecting return in different dimensions, were used
in the study as performance measures. Return on assets
(ROA), a ratio of net income to total assets, measures the
return to the total financing provided by shareholders,
long-term and short-term creditors.

Return on investment

( R O D , a ratio of net income to long-term debt, preferred
equity and common equity, measures the return to capital or
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long-term and permanent financing.

Return on equity (ROE),

or net income divided by equity, is an indicator of the
return to the owners or the shareholders of a lodging firm.
Profit margin (PM), which is net income divided by net
revenue, was also used.

The ratio shows the return in terms

of a lodging firms operation activity or sales, rather than
in terms of financing activity.

Operating return (OR) is

defined as the ratio of operating cash flow to the operating
assets of a lodging firm.

This ratio excludes the effect of

depreciation and interest expenses.

Therefore, it can be a

better measure of managerial performance in comparison with
other profitability ratios.

Further, excluding non-

operational assets investments from the denominator and the
impact of depreciation and interest expenses from the
numerator makes the ratio a better reflection of operating
results.

Using multiple ratios will provide performance

measures from different aspects of a lodging firm's
activities.
In most of previous research on the relationship
between managerial ownership and performance, the
independent variable for regression was managers' ownership
percentage. In a preliminary trial test of this study, the
managers' ownership percentage (MOP) was first derived by
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dividing the shares held by officers or directors by the
total number of outstanding shares.

Managers' ownership

percentage was regressed against different performance
variables.
The preliminary test shows that there is no significant
relationship between managerial ownership measured in
percentage and firm performance relationship (Table 3).
Figure 1 is a plot of managers' ownership versus operating
return(OR).

Table 3
Preliminary Test of the Relationship between Original
Managers!-Ownership and-Perfgrmange_gf all-Hotele

Dependent
variable

MOP

R square

Coefficient

Sig. T

Reject

(Sig. F)

Ho

PM

.246264

.02654

.2793

No

OR

.035080

.02563

.2379

No

RGI

.030959

.00935

.5226

NO

ROE

.098285

.01223

.3395

No

ROA

.154988

.08017

.5541

NO

SR

.247504

.14594

.1574

NO

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

51

a:
d

Figure 1 The Relationship Between Original Managers'
Ownership and Hotels Operating Return

The scatter plot does not demonstrate a linear
relationship between the dependent and independent
variables.

Similarly, none of the other performance

measures has shown any linear pattern when plotted against
the managers' ownership measured by percentage.
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Table 4
Relationship between Original Managers' Ownership Percentage
and Regular Hotel Performance

Dependent
variable

MOP

R square

Coefficient

Sig. T

Rejected

(Sig. F)

Ho

PM

.347519

.09145

.1950

No

OR

.067071

.11270

.1479

No

ROI

.064976

.06592

.2745

No

ROE

2 .053374

.34820

.1969

No

ROA

.014206

.01109

.6586

No

SR

-.254388

.06746

.2688

No

Table 5
Rglationgitip-J?.g.twegn Original Maxag.gXB' .
Qwaerghip percentage
and Casino Hotels Performance

Dependent
variable

Mop

R square

Coefficient

Sig. T

Rejected

(Sig. F)

Ho

PM

.260900

.02157

.4740

No

OR

.007170

.00088

.8854

No

ROI

.017745

.00226

.8176

No

ROE

.197794

.00414

.7548

No

ROA

-.001534

.00005

.9714

No

SR

.430597

.03830

.3380

No
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The same preliminary test was also conducted for the
regular hotel sector and the casino hotel sector
respectively.

Results from linear regression using MOP as

the independent variable show there is no significant
relationship between managers' ownership and performance
(Table 4-5)in either regular hotels or casino hotels.

The

plots of MOP against other performance variables, like
Figure 1, do not show any linear pattern.
Previous studies found the size of firms has an impact
on the incentive that is created by the managers' ownership
percentage.

With the same ownership percentage, the bigger

the company, the larger the incentive.

Therefore, to

investigate the ownership/performance relationship, the
independent variable, MOP need to be adjusted for the size
effect. In this study, to control for the impact of size,
the original MOP was multiplied by size index to obtain the
adjusted MOP.
The observed market value of the firm cannot be used as
a size measure to derive the adjustment index because there
are huge differences in the sizes of the sample firms.
Using observed market value to adjust ownership could
enlarge the real size effect.

For example, the

biggest

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54

size is the 885 times of the smallest size, but the size
effect on ownership cannot be 885 times.

According to the

theory of data transformation, for larger numbers it takes a
great increase in X to produce a small increase in log X.
Therefore, the logarithmic transformation has the effect of
stretching small value of X and condensing large value of X
(Clark,1984).
The logarithmic transformation of the observed market
value can well serve the size adjustment need in this study.
Thus the log to the base 10 of the size (called Lnsize) was
selected for calculating the adjusted index.

The company

with the smallest Lnsize or logarithmic market value was
identified as the benchmark.

The size index was then

created by dividing each company's Lnsize by the benchmark.
Finally, the new independent variable, or the size-adjusted
ownership percentage was obtained by multiplying the
original MOP by the size index.

The size-adjusted MOPs of

the 45 sample firms are displayed in Table 6.
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Table 6
Compare Hotels' Management Ownership Percentage With
Adjusted Management Ownership Percentage

Company Name
CASINO RESOURCE CORP
BUCKHEAD AMERICA CORP
SONESTA INTERNATIONAL HOTELS C
BLACK HAWK GAMING & DEVELOPMEN
MONARCH CASINO & RESORT INC
JAMESON INNS INC
PRATT HOTEL CORP
BOOMTOWN INC
AMERIHOST PROPERTIES INC
PRESIDENT CASINOS INC
JOHN Q HAMMONS HOTELS INC
KAHLER REALTY CORP
STUDIO PLUS HOTELS INC
SUPERTEL HOSPITALITY INC
LADY LUCK GAMING CORP
GAYLORD ENTERTAINMENT CO
HOLLYWOOD CASINO CORP
CASINO MAGIC CORP
HARVEYS CASINO RESORTS
AMERISTAR CASINOS INC
SUBURBAN LODGES OF AMERICA INC
TRUMP HOTELS & CASINO RESORTS
RIO HOTEL & CASINO INC
WYNDHAM HOTEL CORP
AZTAR CORP
SHOWBOAT INC
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC
STATION CASINOS INC
SERVICO INC
BRISTOL HOTEL CO
PRIMADONNA RESORTS INC
EXTENDED STAY AMERICA INC
DOUBLETREE CORP
BOYD GAMING CORP

Original
MOP
0.42401
0.1159
0.64
0.32382
0.65320
0.2033
0.80767
0.16753
0.3184
0.32474
0.4000
0.1904
0.1882
0.32
0.46266
0.63
0.51682
0.32502
0.48975
0.87313
0.8002
0.66988
0.26062
0.8829
0.05701
0.16300
0.1851
0.42415
0.0827
0.1328
0.39510
0.5237
0.1349
0.59375

Size
Index
1.00000
1.04334
1.07125
1.08572
1.12189
1.12190
1.12628
1.13259
1.14035
1.14051
1.15989
1.16228
1.18566
1.18990
1.19399
1.19746
1.21791
1.22669
1.22839
1.24638
1.24898
1.25156
1.25970
1.26648
1.27920
1.28421
1.28644
1.28821
1.28942
1.29201
1.30885
1.31068
1.31625
1.32187

Adjusted
Index
0.424010
0.120889
0.685598
0.351576
0.732818
0.228104
0.909664
0.189746
0.363121
0.370368
0.463956
0.221269
0.223162
0.380768
0.552416
0.754398
0.629434
0.398693
0.601601
1.088256
0.999386
0.838401
0.328302
1.118146
0.072928
0.209326
0.238158
0.546396
0.106614
0.171583
0.517129
0.686341
0.177575
0.78486
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STARWOOD LODGING CORP
BALLY ENTERTAINMENT CORP
SHOLODGE INC
LA QUINTA INNS INC
MGM GRAND INC
MIRAGE RESORTS INC
HOST MARRIOTT CORP
GRIFFIN GAMING & ENTERTAINMENT
CIRCUS CIRCUS ENTERPRISES INC
HILTON HOTELS CORP
RENAISSANCE HOTEL GROUP N V

0.17
0.16800
0.4054
0.1580
0.73000
0.18900
0.1142
0.37480
0.19000
0.25269
0.61

1.33199
1.35008
1.35881
1.36691
1.37502
1.38952
1.39141
1.40033
1.42460
1.44134
1.45559

0.226438
0.226813
0.550906
0.215915
1.003761
0.262619
0.158914
0.524845
0.270674
0.36421
0.887908

Same size adjustments are done separately for regular
and casino hotels.

The size-adjusted MOPs for these two

sectors are displayed in table 7 and Table 8.

Table 7
Compare Casino Hotels' Méuiagement Ownership Percentage
With Adjusted Management Ownership Percentage
Company Name

Original
MOP
CASINO RESOURCE CORP
0.42401
BLACK HAWK GAMING & DEVELOPMENT 0.32382
MONARCH CASINO & RESORT INC
0.65320
PRATT HOTEL CORP
0.80767
BOOMTOWN INC
0.16753
PRESIDENT CASINOS INC
0.32474
LADY LUCK GAMING CORP
0.46266
GAYLORD ENTERTAINMENT CO
0.63
HOLLYWOOD CASINO CORP
0.51682
CASINO MAGIC CORP
0.32502
HARVEYS CASINO RESORTS
0.48975
AMERISTAR CASINOS INC
0.87313
TRUMP HOTELS & CASINO RESORTS
0.66988
RIO HOTEL & CASINO INC
0.26062
AZTAR CORP
0.05701

Size
Adjusted
Index
Index
1.000000 0.424010
1.080068 0.349747
1.116051 0.729005
1.120423 0.904931
1.126693 0.188759
1.134580 0.368441
1.187783 0.549542
1.191228 0.750473
1.211572 0.626159
1.220306 0.396619
1.221996 0.598471
1.239895 1.082594
1.245049 0.834039
1.253143 0.326594
1.272547 0.072549
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SHOWBOAT INC
STATION CASINOS INC
PRIMADONNA RESORTS INC
BOYD GAMING CORP
BALLY ENTERTAINMENT CORP
MGM GRAND INC
MIRAGE RESORTS INC
GRIFFIN GAMING & ENTERTAINMENT
CIRCUS CIRCUS ENTERPRISES INC
HILTON HOTELS CORP

0.16300
0.42415
0.39510
0.59375
0.16800
0.73000
0.18900
0.37480
0.19000
0.25269

1.277525 0.208237
1.281511 0.543553
1.302043 0.514439
1.314990 0.780777
1.343053 0.225633
1.367861 0.998539
1.382288 0.261252
1.393049 0.522115
1.417187 0.269265
1.433836 0.362315

Table 8
Compare Regular Hotels' Management Ownership Percentage
With Adjusted Management Ownership Percentage
Company Name

Original
MOP
BUCKHEAD AMERICA CORP
0.1159
SONESTA INTERNATIONAL HOTELS
0.64
JAMESON INNS INC
0.2033
AMERIHOST PROPERTIES INC
0.3184
JOHN Q HAMMONS HOTELS INC
0.4000
KAHLER REALTY CORP
0.1904
STUDIO PLUS HOTELS INC
0.1882
SUPERTEL HOSPITALITY INC
0.32
SUBURBAN LODGES OF AMERICA INC 0.8002
WYNDHAM HOTEL CORP
0.8829
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC
0.1851
SERVICO INC
0.0827
BRISTOL HOTEL CO
0.1328
EXTENDED STAY AMERICA INC
0.5237
DOUBLETREE CORP
0.1349
STARWOOD LODGING CORP
0.17
SHOLODGE INC
0.4054
LA QUINTA INNS INC
0.1580
HOST MARRIOTT CORP
0.1142
RENAISSANCE HOTEL GROUP N V
0.61

Size
Adjusted
Index
Index
1.0000
0.1159
1.0268
0.6571
1.0753
0.2186
1.0930
0.3480
1.1117
0.4447
1.1140
0.2121
1.1364
0.2139
1.1405
0.3650
1.1971
0.9579
1.2139
1.0717
1.2330
0.2283
1.2359
0.1022
1.2383
0.1645
1.2562
0.6578
1.2616
0.1702
1.2767
0.2170
1.3024
0.5280
1.3101
0.2069
1.3336
0.1523
1.3951
0.8510
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The smallest index is one, for the smallest company,
casino Resources corporate itself.
companies are larger than one.

As the indexes of other

The size adjusted MOPs of

the companies are all greater than the original MOP.
Choosing the smallest Lnsize as the benchmark is pure
personal preference.

The median and the largest Lnsize can

also be chosen as the benchmark without affecting the
results.
Previous studies created different groups for firms
with different size ranges, then regression was conducted
for different size groups.

In this study, regression for

different size groups are not appropriate because of the
small sample size.

Summary
In this chapter, the data and research methodology for
this study have been discussed.

The selection of the

dependent variables, performance, and the independent
variable, adjusted MOP, have been presented.

The results of

statistical testing will be presented in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
R ESULTS AND F IN D IN G S

Introduction
In chapter 3, the methodology and procedures for data
selection and data analysis have been discussed.

In this

chapter, an overview of the mean financial performances of
the lodging industry is first presented before the results
of the statistical testing are discussed.

Overview of Performance
The descriptive statistics of the financial
performances of the lodging industry as a whole, and the two
sub-groups of hotel and casino sectors are shown in Tables
9-11.

A comparison of Table 10 and Table 11 shows that

hotels outperformed casinos on ROA, ROI and ROE, while
casinos outperformed hotels on SR and PM based on the mean
values.

59
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Table 9
Descriptive Statistics of Performance Measures
for all Hotels
Mean

Std Dev

Minimum

Maximum

N

ROA

.03

.04

- .05

.09

45

ROI

.04

.05

- .05

.23

45

OR

.09

.04

-. 01

.19

45

SR

.16

.32

-.27

1.42

45

ROE

.13

.27

- .42

1.37

45

PM

.43

.14

.05

.79

45

Variable

Table 10
P.gAgrJ,ptiy-e. St.a.tistigs o f. PerfprmansÆ. Heagures
£gj Regular. Hotelg

measure

Mean

std Dev

Minimum

Maximum

SR

.06

.08

- .10

.20

ROA

.04

.03

- .04

.09

ROI

.06

.06

- .05

.23

OR

.09

.05

- .01

.19

ROE

.20

.39

- .42

1.37

PM

.42

.20

.05

.79
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Table 11

Descriptive Statistics of Performance Measures
for Casino Hotels
measure

Mean

Std Dev

Minimum

Méiximum

SR

.22

.35

- .27

1.42

ROA

.02

.04

- .05

.08

ROI

.02

.04

- .03

.09

OR

.09

.03

.05

.12

ROE

.07

.07

- .05

.17

PM

.44

.06

.32

.60

Test Results
Hypothesis 1
The purpose of this hypothesis was to examine the
relationship between managers' ownership and performance of
lodging firms. Results from linear regression which used the
size adjusted MOP as the independent variable were presented
in Table 10. From the linear regression, the results show
positive linear relationship between managers' ownership
and three of the six measures of performance.

The null
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hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between
managers' ownership and performance is rejected for half of
the performance measures with a significant level of
level.

0.05

Table 12 demonstrates the regression results.

Table 12
Relationship Between Adjusted Managers' Ownership Percentage
And All Hotels Performance

Adju. MOP

R

Sig. T

Reject

Coefficient

square

(Sig. F)

Ho

PM

.303838

.39982

.0000

YES*

OR

.057639

.19486

.0024

YES*

ROI

.041798

.05582

.1182

NO

ROE

.422057

.20802

.0016

YES*

ROA

.006935

.00290

.7255

NO

SR

.203024

.03338

.2297

NO

Dependent
variable

* significant at 0.05 level
The relationship between ownership and profit margin of
hotels is significant at extremely high significant
level(F=0.0000).

Figure 2 demonstrates a positive linear

relationship between the two variables.

Therefore null sub
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hypothesis h^^g, that there is no relationship between
managers' ownership and profit margin of hotels is strongly
rejected.
Same positive linear relationship is shown between
adjusted MOP and operating return, and between managers'
ownership and return on equity at the 0.05 significant
level.

When adjusted MOP is plotted against performance

variables, a linear pattern is obvious (see Figure 3-4).
Therefore the null sub-hypotheses

are rejected.

The relationships between managers' ownership and other
measures of performance: return on assets, return on
investment and stock return are not significant at the 0.05
level.

Their plots do not suggest a linear pattern (see

Figure 5-7) .

Therefore, null sub-hypotheses

are accepted.
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CL 0.0,
0.0

.2

RELMOP
Figure 2 : Scatter Plot for Relationship between Adjusted
Managers' Ownership and Hotels Profit Margin.

0.0

.2

REL.MOP
Figure 3: Scatter Plot For Relationship Between Adjusted
Managers' Ownership And Hotels Operating Return
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0.0
LÜ

O
G:
RELMOP
Figure 4: Scatter Plot for Relationship between Adjusted
Managers' Ownership and Hotels Return on Equity

. 10.

.08'
.06'
.04.
.02'

0.00
-.02.

< -.04
0: -.06,
0.0

1.0

1.2

RELMOP
Figure 5; Scatter Plot for Relationship between Adjusted
Managers' Ownership and Hotels Return on Assets
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0.0

.2

RELMOP
Figure 6: Scatter Plot for Relationship between Adjusted
Managers' Ownership And Hotels Return on
Investment

0 0-R E L .^ O P

i.u

1.Ü

REL.MOP
Figure 7; Scatter Plot for Relationship between Adjusted
Managers' Ownership and Hotels Stock Return
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The regression was further conducted for the regular
hotel sector and the casino hotel sector separately.
Results show that there is significant relationship between
the adjusted MOP and some performance measures (Table 1314).

Some are significant at the 0.05 level, such as PM (in

regular hotels and in casino hotels), OR(in regular hotels),
ROE(in regular hotels). Some are significant at the 0.1
level, such as ROI (in regular hotels), OR(in casino hotels)
and ROE(in casino hotels).
Table 13
Relationship between Adjusted Managers' Ownership Percentage
and Regular Hotels Performance

Dependent

Adju. MOP

R

Sig. T

Rejected

Coefficient

square

(Sig. P)

Ho

PM

.478410

.51030

.0004

Yes*

OR

.092861

.30768

.0111

Yes*

ROI

.074054

.14384

.0991

Yes**

ROE

.885969

.45728

.0011

Yes*

ROA

.017944

.03138

.4550

No

SR

.033525

.01435

.6150

No

variable

* significant at 0.05 level

** significant at 0.1 level

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68
Table 14

Relationship between Adjusted Managers' Ownership Percentage
and casinos Hotels Performance

*

Dependent

Adju. MOP

R

Sig. T

Rejected

variable

Coefficient

square

(Sig. F)

Ho

PM

.147889

.38868

.0009

Yes*

OP

.033004

.12468

.0834

Yes**

ROI

.044547

.10820

.1084

no

ROE

.098601

.13924

.0662

Yes**

ROA

.009200

.00371

.7723

no

SR

.274797

.07487

.1857

no

significant at 0.05 level ** significant at 0.1 level

The relationship between the adjusted MOP and profit
margin is highly significant in both regular hotels and
casino hotels (at the 0.05 level).

The relationship between

the adjusted MOP and return on equity is significant at the
0.05 level in regular hotels, and at the 0.1 level in casino
hotels.

The relationship between the adjusted MOP and

operating return is significant at 0.05 level in regular
hotels, and at 0.1 level in casino hotels.

The relationship

between the adjusted MOP and return on investment is
marginally significant for regular hotels(at the 0.1 level).
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but slightly below the 0.1 level for casino hotels.

The

relationship between the adjusted MOP and ROA is not
significant in either regular or casino hotel groups.
Likewise the relationship between the adjusted MOP and stock
return is not significant in either regular or casino
hotels.
The regression results show that there are some
differences in the managerial ownership/performance
relationship between regular hotels and casino hotels.

The

ownership/performance relationship is found to be more
significant for regular hotels than for casino hotels in
terms of statistical significant level, the adjusted MOP
coefficients and the R^s.

Hypothesis 2;
This hypothesis was developed to examine the
performance differences between hotels which have different
ownership percentage levels. The non-paramatric KruskalWallis one way Anova test was used because of the small
sample size and

non-normal distribution of data.

The 45 hotels were divided into 3 sub groups.

Firms

which have adjusted MOP at 33.3% or below were classified
into group 1.

Those with 34%-66% adjusted MOP were
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classified into group 2, and those with above 67% adjusted
MOP into group 3.
The test results were presented in Table 15.

The

results show that profit margin and operating return have
significant differences between different groups at the 0.05
and the 0.1 significant levels respectively.
sub-hypotheses Hj.a, and

So the null

are rejected for these two

performance ratios.

Table 15
Kruskal-Wallis 1-wav ANOVA Test for _Testing Performance
Differences in Hotels which have Different Ownership Levels.
Performance

*

Sig.

Reject

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Meam

Mean

Mean

Réuik

Rank

Rank

PM

15.39

22 .53

35 .00

.0003

YES*

ROA

24 .31

21.23

23.25

.7952

NO

ROE

20.83

21.60

28 .00

.3006

NO

ROI

22.94

19.67

27.25

.3266

NO

OR

18.56

23.30

29.29

.0894

YES**

SR

23.19

24.47

20.88

.7766

NO

significant at 0.05 level

H:

** significant at 0.1 level
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Other measures of performance, return on assets, return
on equity, return on investment and stock return have not
shown any significant differences, so those null sub
hypotheses

Hz.c., Hj.d, and

are

accepted.

As the cut off point for grouping may affect the real
difference between groups, different cut off percentages
were tried in the Kruskal-Wallis test.

The results were

similar.

Hypothesis 3
The purpose of testing Hypothesis 3 is to examine the
difference in the growth between the two sectors, i.e.
regular hotels and casino hotels.
presented in Table 14.

The test result is

The result shows that there is a

significant difference in sales growth between the regular
and casino hotel sector at the 0.1 significant level.
Therefore the null hypothesis Hj of no difference in growth
is rejected.

The casino hotel sector is really a fast-

growth sector while regular hotels can be regarded as a slow
growth sector of the lodging industry.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72

Table 16

Mann-Whitney— test f<?r .5 -y ears salgg .growth-diffgrgngg
between regular hotels and casino hotels.

Mean Rank
16.88
23 .17

cases
17
variable 1= regular hotels
23
variable 2 = casino hotels

corrected for ties
U
Z
2-Tailed P
134.0
-1.6831
.0924*
* significant at 0.1 level

Summary and Discussion of Findings
The purpose of this study is twofold.

First, this

study intends to investigate if there is a significant
relationship between managers' ownership and
hotels'/casinos' performance and how performance is related
to managers' ownership.

Further, it intends to find out if

there is significant performance difference between firms
with different MOP levels.

Second, this study examines if

the managers' ownership/performance relationship differs
across the slow-growing hotel sector and the fast-growing
casino hotel sector.
In the linear regression, the test rejected three of
six of the null sub-hypotheses of the tested performance
measures.

The null hypotheses of ROI ratio was barely

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

73

rejected at the 0.1 level.

In particular, the three

performance measures with Ho rejected at high significance
level, ROE, PM, and OR, are ratios more relevant to
shareholders, or more operational and managerial in nature.
Therefore, the linear regression results lean towards the
rejection of the null hypothesis.
The manager's ownership has the positive linear
relationship with most of the performance measures since the
coefficients of adjusted MOP are all positive.

Increasing

managers' ownership seems a way to better converge the
interests of managers and stockholders. Increasing managers'
ownership can improve hotels' profit margin, operating
return, and return on equity in particular.
In the linear regression, the performance measures of
ROA and ROI were not found having significant relationship
with MOP. The test results reveal a pattern that shows when
the ratio becomes more relevant to equity owners or the
shareholders, the relationship is more significant.

Table

15 is a comparison of the test results of ROE, ROI and ROA
for the lodging industry as a whole.

The ROA ratio is a

ratio of net income to total assets or total financing which
includes financing provided by shareholders and by both
short- and long-term creditors.

When ROA was reduced to ROI
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with the short-term liabilities removed from the
denominator, the relationship between MOP and performance
became barely significant.

When ROI was further reduced to

ROE with the removal of all liabilities from the
denominator, the relationship between the MOP and
performance becomes highly significant.

The same pattern

appears in the linear regression results of the two sectors
(see Tables 11 and 12).

This pattern strongly suggests that

MOP can better converge the interests of management and the
shareholders, rather than the interests of management and
those of shareholders and creditors combined.
Table 17
Comparing relationship JsLg.tws.en. reJAtivg.gyngrship and
three meaguc.es .<}£. perf ormanoo

Dependent

Financing Provider in

R

Variable

the denominator of the

square

Sig. t

ratio
ROA

all financing providers

.00290

.7255

ROI

long-term creditors

.05582

.1182

.20802

.0016*

and shareholders
ROE

Shareholders

* significant at 0.05 level
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The stock return was found not significantly related to
the ownership. This finding is consistent with the findings
of Tsetsekos and DeFusco's study (1990) .

There are two

possible reasons for the insignificant relationship.
the market factors may have distorted the results.

First,
Stock

prices are very sensitive to external events that may have
little to do with how efficiently a hotel is run and that
are totally beyond management's control(Deckop,1987) .
Second, the time frame of the performance ratios may be too
short to cause market reaction.

The stock price measures

indicate what investors think of a company's past
performance and future prospects(Brigham, 1985).

Probably a

quarter's performance is not sufficient to cause significant
reaction from the market.
The Kruskal-Wallis one way Anova test shows that PM and
OR at different managers' ownership level differ
significantly.

This finding is consistent with the linear

regression results.

ROE was not significant in the test.

A possible reason may be the non-parametic method itself.
The advantage of the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test is
that it requires fewer assumptions than other tests.

The

disadvantage is that it is less powerful or less sensitive
in finding differences when they exist in the population
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(Norusis,1995).

Therefore, using non-parametric tests may

fail to display some important differences.
The empirical result of Kesner (1987) indicated that,
for low-growth industries, managers' stock ownership did not
appear to influence either current or future performance.
Alternatively, high-growth industries did reveal a positive
and significant relationship between stock ownership of the
board and performance.

In this study, regressions were

performed separately for the slow-growing hotel sector and
fast-growing casino sector.

The finding is quite different

from Kesner's result (1987).

A comparison between Table 13

and 14 show that the slow-growing hotel sector obtained even
higher statistical significance levels in the test of the
relationship between adjusted MOP and performances (PM, OR,
ROE and ROI).

The higher significance level associated with

the regular hotels' tests suggest that there is a stronger
relationship between MOP and performance in the slow-growing
hotel sector than in the fast-growing casino hotel sector.
Increasing MOP may be a more effective tool for regular
hotels to improve performance.
may explain the findings.

There are two reasons that

First, in casino hotels the major

part of profits comes from gambling operation rather than
from lodging or food and beverage operations. There are more
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other factors that may have influence on casino hotels'
performance than on regular hotels', such as high rollers'
winning or losing, gaming legalization in other states,
merger and consolidation of large gaming companies, etc.
Those other factors may have distorted the fast-growing
casino hotel sector's MOP/performance relationship.
the data used for this study is from 1995-1996.
1995, the regular hotel sector has been booming.

Second,

Since later
Room

occupancy has achieved the highest level since 1989.
Therefore, this "slow-growing" sector may be experiencing a
fast growth phase recently.

On the other hand, the rapid

expansion of the casino hotels has recently slowed because
of market saturation, particularly in emerging markets.
Therefore, the regular hotel may be relatively fast-growing
as compared with the casino hotels in the 1995-96 period.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND C O N C LU TIO N S

This chapter summarizes the findings of the study and
makes some conclusions based on the empirical findings.
Limitations of the study and recommendations for further
research are also discussed.

Summary
To answer the first research question, linear
regression was used to investigate the relationship between
managers ownership and lodging firms' performance.

After

the adjustment for size effect, the results revealed that
management ownership had a significant relationship with
sample firms' performance in terms of operational and
managerial activities and shareholder's relevance, such as
profit margin, hotels operating return and hotels return on
equity.

Performances measured by those ratios are

positively and linearly related to managers' ownership.
Kruskal-Wallis test was further used to look for performance
differences between different ownership levels. The results
of profit margin and operating return did show significant
difference between different groups.

To answer the second

78
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research question, two separate regressions were performed.
The results indicated that managers' ownership may be a more
effective tool in interests alignment for regular hotels
than for casino hotels.

Conclusions
In this study, significant relationship between MOP and
performance measures that are operational, managerial and
shareholder-relevant has been found.

The findings have

provided an important empirical evidence for the agency
theory from a service industry.

The results are consistent

with those of Kim, Lee, and Francis (1988), and Hudson,
Jahera and Lloyd (1992).

Managers' ownership in the lodging

industry could provide managers with long-term incentive,
could better align their interests with shareholders',
reduce agency cost, and therefore enhance hotels
performance.

The MOP may be more effective for the regular

hotels to improve performance.

The lodging industry may use

ESOPs with an emphasize on managerial ownership as a tool to
improve regular hotels performance in its continuing
recovery.
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Limitations of the Study
This study did not control other factors which could
effect the ownership/performance relationship in lodging
industry, particularly in casino hotel sector.
This study considers hotel performance only in a short
time frame.

Which means that MOP effect on performance may

not be fully displayed and that the market may not react
quickly enough to the performance change.

Recommendations for Future Research
(1) In order to overcome the small sample size
limitation, future research should use other databases to
obtain a larger sample size.

A larger sample size could

provide more reliable results that can be generalized to the
whole industry.
(2) In further research, the financial performance
should be examined for a longer time horizon instead of
three months.
(3) Debt use could have an impact on managers'
ownership and on stock return.

Future study can use debt

ratio as another independent variable to investigate the
relationship.
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(4) Future study can separate the management companies
from the holding companies and further investigate the
effect of different business types on the MOP/performance
relationship.
(5) This study is focused on the lodging industry.
There are a lot of managers' ownership practice in other
service industries.

The restaurant industry, for example,

has large MOP but few of restaurant firms are successful.
Further studies can extend the investigation into other
hospitality industries, such as food service industry and
non-gaming entertainment industry for more evidence from
service industries.
(6) Future research can investigate the relationship
between managers' ownership and performance for hospitality
firms at different corporation development stages.
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